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THE IMPACT OF COLEMAN V POWER ON THE 
POLICING, DEFENCE AND SENTENCING OF PUBLIC 
NUISANCE CASES IN QUEENSLAND 
TAMARA WALSH∗ 
[The High Court’s decision in Coleman v Power promised to provide the many defendants charged 
with offensive language, offensive behaviour and public nuisance with a means of contesting their 
charge. The majority of the Court stated that the purpose of such offences was to maintain public 
order and to protect the public from harm, and they interpreted the scope of such offences relatively 
narrowly. Therefore, it was expected that the policing, defence and sentencing of ‘offensive’ 
defendants would have changed since Coleman v Power was handed down. To test this assumption, 
the outcomes of public nuisance cases in Brisbane and Townsville in July 2005 (10 months after 
Coleman v Power) were compared with those from July 2004 (two months before Coleman v Power). 
It was found that while more public nuisance defendants were contesting their charge(s), more 
people were being charged with the offence, that situations leading to a charge did not accord with 
the standard of seriousness established in Coleman v Power, and that sentencing outcomes were no 
different. Thus, it appears that Coleman v Power is not being followed at the ‘ground level’ of 
policing, defending and sentencing public nuisance cases in Queensland.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
In September 2004, the High Court handed down its decision in Cole-
man v Power,1 a case that examined the relationship between insulting language 
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 1 (2004) 220 CLR 1 (‘Coleman’). 
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and the implied constitutional freedom of political communication.2 While it has 
been argued that the decision is of limited relevance to the constitutional 
interpretation of the implied freedom,3 the Court’s comments on the scope of 
‘offensive conduct’ promised to provide a ray of hope to community lawyers 
who are routinely faced with the task of defending ‘vulnerable’4 clients against 
such charges.  
A study conducted by the author in February 2004 and a further study in July 
20045 revealed a high number of vulnerable people being charged with offensive 
language, offensive behaviour and ‘public nuisance’ in Queensland.6 Addition-
ally, it was found that many people were being charged with these offences for 
unavoidable behaviour such as vomiting, trivial behaviour such as arm waving, 
and conduct commonly considered to fall outside the scope of public nuisance, 
such as engaging in domestic disputes.7 Further, around one-third of such 
charges were for conduct directed at a police officer.8 
Coleman promised to put an end to this pattern for three reasons, each of 
which will be further explored in this article. First, a majority of the High Court 
agreed that the legitimate end which public order offences are intended to 
achieve is the protection of the public from harms including disorder, violence, 
intimidation and serious affront.9 This provides police and magistrates with some 
guidance on how public order offences should be enforced. Second, a majority of 
the Court construed the offence of ‘insulting words’ narrowly.10 The majority’s 
comments imply that a certain level of seriousness is required before ‘offensive’ 
conduct will amount to a criminal offence. Third, several of the judges agreed 
that public order offences should be applied by the police for the protection of 
the public rather than as a means of defending themselves against dissention.11 
On these bases, it would be expected that the policing, defence and sentencing 
of public nuisance offenders would have changed since the Coleman decision 
was handed down. To determine whether this was in fact the case, a further study 
 
 2 See especially Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, where the 
two-limbed test for determining whether a particular piece of legislation impinged upon the 
implied freedom of political communication (‘the Lange test’) was authoritatively consolidated. 
 3 See, eg, Roger Douglas, ‘The Constitutional Freedom to Insult: The Insignificance of Cole-
man v Power’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 23, 37. 
 4 In this study, ‘vulnerable’ individuals were defined to include persons whose age, sex, 
indigenous status, socioeconomic status or impaired capacity marginalise their status in society. 
 5 See Tamara Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance: Empirical 
and Theoretical Analyses’ (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 123; Tamara Walsh, 
‘Won’t Pay or Can’t Pay? Exploring the Use of Fines as a Sentencing Alternative for Public 
Nuisance Type Offences in Queensland’ (2005) 17 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 217. 
 6 Most Australian jurisdictions prohibit ‘offensive’ behaviour and/or language: see, eg, Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) ss 4, 4A; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 7; Summary Offences 
Act 1966 (Vic) s 17. However, in Queensland, the offence is now termed ‘public nuisance’: see 
Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6. See below n 21 for an explanation of the different uses of 
the term ‘public nuisance’ in this article.  
 7 Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance’, above n 5, 135–7; 
Walsh, ‘Won’t Pay or Can’t Pay?’, above n 5, 226–7. 
 8 Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance’, above n 5, 142. 
 9 See Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 24 (Gleeson CJ), 74, 77 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 86–7 
(Kirby J). 
 10 Ibid 25 (Gleeson CJ), 73 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 86–7 (Kirby J). 
 11 Ibid 26 (Gleeson CJ), 79 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 99 (Kirby J). 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.51.26 PM — page 193 of 20
  
2006] The Impact of Coleman v Power 193 
     
was conducted in July 2005. Through a comparison of the July 2004 and July 
2005 studies, it was found that Coleman had had some, albeit limited, impact on 
the kinds of cases that were prosecuted and on the rate of not guilty pleas, but 
had not resulted in significant differences in the policing or sentencing of public 
nuisance in Queensland.  
I I   THE DECISION OF  THE COURT IN  COLEMAN 
A  Overview 
Patrick Coleman appears to have been well-known to Queensland Police in 
Townsville.12 On the occasion at issue in Coleman, he was protesting in a 
pedestrian mall by holding up placards and distributing pamphlets alleging that 
certain Townsville police officers were corrupt. Constable Brendan Power 
approached Coleman and asked for a pamphlet. In response, Coleman announced 
to passers-by: ‘This is Constable Brendan Power, a corrupt police officer’.13 
Constable Power told Coleman that he was under arrest for using insulting 
language under s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 
(Qld) (since repealed).14 Section 7(1) made it an offence to, inter alia, use 
threatening, abusive or insulting words, or to engage in riotous, violent, disor-
derly, indecent, offensive, threatening or insulting behaviour. 
Coleman argued before the Queensland Court of Appeal,15 and subsequently 
the High Court,16 that s 7(1)(d) placed an unconstitutional restriction on the 
implied freedom of political communication enshrined in the Constitution.17 
Thomas JA, with whom Davies JA agreed, dismissed the appeal, holding that the 
offence placed only a slight or incidental burden on the implied freedom.18 In 
any case, the majority found the burden was ‘reasonably appropriate and 
adapted’ towards the achievement of a ‘legitimate end’ consistent with the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible govern-
ment.19 McMurdo P dissented, arguing that while s 7(1)(d) contributed towards a 
‘genuine regulatory scheme’ aimed at fulfilling a legitimate governmental end, it 
was too broadly framed to be proportionate to achieving that end.20 
 
 12 See Coleman v Greenland [2004] QSC 37 (Unreported, Cullinane J, 5 March 2004); Cole-
man v Kinbacher [2003] QCA 575 (Unreported, McMurdo P, Davies JA and Chesterman J, 24 
December 2003); Sellars v Coleman [2001] 2 Qd R 565. 
 13 See, eg, Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 21 (Gleeson CJ). 
 14 Coleman was also charged with the offence of distributing printed matter containing insulting 
words under Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) s 7A(1)(c), repealed by 
Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). This section was declared invalid by the Court of Appeal and 
the conviction under that section was set aside: see Power v Coleman [2002] 2 Qd R 620, 648 
(Thomas JA). 
 15 Power v Coleman [2002] 2 Qd R 620. 
 16 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1.  
 17 Section 7(1)(d) prohibited the use of ‘any threatening, abusive, or insulting words to any person’ 
in or near a public place. 
 18 Power v Coleman [2002] 2 Qd R 620, 645 (Thomas JA). 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 Ibid 630–1. 
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Seemingly in direct response to McMurdo P’s comments, the Queensland 
Parliament repealed s 7 of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 
(Qld) and replaced it with the offence of ‘public nuisance’.21 The Vagrants, 
Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) was subsequently repealed in its 
entirety by the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld). The public nuisance offence 
now appears in Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6. The use of ‘insulting 
words’ was not included as an example of legally unacceptable conduct in this 
revised offence: under Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6, language will be 
considered legally unacceptable only if it was ‘offensive, obscene, indecent or 
abusive’.22 
Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted23 regarding the constitu-
tional validity of s 7(1)(d). The Court in a 6:1 majority concluded that the 
offence was ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ towards achieving a legitimate 
end consistent with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and 
responsible government.24 McHugh J dissented on this point, arguing that the 
offence was framed too widely to be considered ‘reasonably appropriate and 
adapted’ to the sufficient standard.25  
Coleman provides some clarification regarding the definition of political 
communication, confirming that allegations of corruption against police officers 
may be considered an example of political communication,26 and that insults fall 
within the scope of ‘communication’.27 It further confirms the applicability of 
the constitutional freedom to state legislation.28 However, the case’s constitu-
tional implications have been dealt with in other articles.29 The focus of this 
article is on the potential ramifications of Coleman on the policing, defence and 
sentencing of offensive behaviour, offensive language and related offences, and 
whether this potential has been realised in practice.  
The relevance of Coleman to public nuisance and similar offences lies in the 
fact that, in its judgment, the High Court did not confine itself to the ‘insulting 
words’ aspect of the offence. On many occasions, the judges spoke generally 
 
 21 This new offence was first introduced as Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) 
s 7AA by Police Powers and Responsibilities and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Qld) 
s 50. In this article the term ‘public nuisance’ will refer to a range of legally unacceptable con-
duct as prohibited in various Australian jurisdictions. By contrast, the term ‘public nuisance 
offence’ will refer to the specific legislative prohibition contained in Summary Offences Act 2005 
(Qld) s 6. 
 22 Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6(3)(b). The author has argued elsewhere that, in practice, 
the distinction between these terms is largely illusory: see Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offen-
sive Behaviour and Public Nuisance’, above n 5, 132.  
 23 Coleman v Power (Unreported, High Court of Australia, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 15 
November 2002). 
 24 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 32 (Gleeson CJ), 79 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 99 (Kirby J), 
112–13 (Callinan J), 127 (Heydon J). 
 25 Ibid 53–4. 
 26 See, eg, ibid 88 (Kirby J).  
 27 See, eg, ibid 122 (Heydon J).  
 28 See, eg, ibid 43 (McHugh J), citing Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
 29 See, eg, Douglas, above n 3; Elisa Arcioni, ‘Developments in Free Speech Law in Australia: 
Coleman and Mulholland’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 333; Graeme Hill, ‘Freedom of Politi-
cal Speech’ (2005) 13 Litigation Notes 7; Tamara Walsh and Scott McDougall, ‘Nuisance to the 
Public or Nuisance to the Police?’ (2004) 24(9) Proctor 24.  
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about s 7,30 ‘offensive language and offensive behaviour’,31 and legislation 
creating ‘public order offences’.32 Indeed, Gummow and Hayne JJ explicitly 
stated that a provision such as s 7(1) should not be construed by divorcing the 
individual elements from the context in which they appear.33 Thus, the comments 
by the Court are of continuing relevance to the new public nuisance offence in 
Queensland as well as to other public order offences throughout Australia. 
Three aspects of the judgment have the capacity to impact on the way in which 
the public nuisance offence and other similar offences are policed, defended and 
disposed of by the lower courts: the Court’s comments on the purpose of the 
offence; the scope of the offence; and the application of the offence in circum-
stances where the language or behaviour in question was directed at a police 
officer. Each of these will be discussed in turn.  
B  The Purpose of the Offence 
In considering the second limb of the Lange test,34 each of the seven High 
Court judges proffered examples of possible ‘legitimate ends’ to which offences 
such as s 7 might be directed. 
Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ all agreed that the end to 
which the section was directed was ‘public order’.35 However, the judges 
differed widely in their definitions of this concept. For example, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ seemed to equate public order with the maintenance of ‘civilised’ 
standards of communication.36 Heydon J outlined three specific sub-ends 
associated with public order to which the offence in question might be directed: 
the prevention of ‘provocative statements of an insolent, scornful, contemptuous 
or abusive character’;37 to ‘forestall the wounding’38 of persons who would 
otherwise be insulted; and to prevent others who hear the insults from feeling 
‘intimidated or otherwise upset’.39 Thus, on Heydon J’s analysis, maintaining 
public order extends to preventing individuals’ feelings from being wounded.40 
Gleeson CJ noted that, in 1931, the ‘breach of the peace’ element was removed 
from the s 7 offence.41 In light of this, his Honour stated that the intention of 
Parliament must have been to extend the scope of the offence to the prohibition 
of behaviour that posed no threat of a breach of the peace.42 Gleeson CJ re-
 
 30 See, eg, Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 32 (Gleeson CJ), 41 (McHugh J), 73–4 (Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
 31 See, eg, ibid 24–6 (Gleeson CJ), 98–9 (Kirby J). 
 32 See, eg, ibid 32 (Gleeson CJ), 99–100 (Kirby J), 113–14 (Callinan J). 
 33 Ibid 72. 
 34 See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567–8 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
 35 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 32 (Gleeson CJ), 33 (McHugh J), 98 (Kirby J), 112–14 
(Callinan J), 122, 127 (Heydon J). 
 36 Ibid 111–12 (Callinan J), 122 (Heydon J).  
 37 Ibid 121. 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 Ibid 121–2, 124. 
 41 Ibid 22–4. 
 42 Ibid 22. 
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marked that it would be legitimate for an offence such as s 7 to be directed 
towards preventing any behaviour that ‘may seriously disturb public order’43 
without causing a breach of the peace. His Honour concluded that the legitimate 
end of such legislation was ‘the preservation of order in public spaces in the 
interests of the amenity and security of citizens’.44  
Kirby J’s conception of public order was somewhat narrower than that of 
Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ. Having identified ‘public order’ as the 
legitimate end to which the offence was directed, Kirby J went on to say that the 
legislation was confined to ‘preventing and sanctioning public violence and 
provocation to such conduct.’45  
Similarly, Gummow and Hayne JJ concluded that s 7 was aimed at ensuring 
that public places were free from violence. In coming to this conclusion, they 
attached some importance to the fact that the section created criminal offences 
punishable by imprisonment.46 This implied that the section was intended to 
serve public, rather than private, purposes. Further, their Honours noted that, 
read as a whole, the section was mainly aimed at the prevention of violent 
behaviour (through the prohibitions on ‘threatening’, ‘riotous’ and ‘violent’ 
behaviour).47 This conclusion was a necessary element in their Honours’ finding 
that the section was ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ to achieving a legiti-
mate governmental end. In Gummow and Hayne JJ’s view, a section aimed at 
ensuring the civility of discourse could not be considered proportionate to the 
burden it placed on the common law right of free speech.48 
Identifying a majority position on the definition of ‘public order’ is less than 
straightforward, as the seventh judge, McHugh J, did not engage in any detailed 
analysis on the point. His Honour rejected the Solicitor-General’s submissions 
that the section was directed either at preventing breaches of the peace or 
preventing the intimidation of participants in political debates,49 but otherwise 
provided little guidance on his conception of ‘public order’. 
Gleeson CJ’s position is located somewhere in between that of Gummow, 
Hayne and Kirby JJ on the one hand and that of Callinan and Heydon JJ on the 
other. Thus, the narrower construction of ‘public order’ must prevail. It seems 
that a majority of judges — Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ and probably 
Gleeson CJ — would support the proposition that the purpose of laws in the 
nature of s 7 was to maintain public order, in the sense of ensuring the safety and 
security of members of the public accessing public spaces.  
Incidentally, this conclusion is consistent with public statements of the former 
Attorney-General of Queensland, Rod Welford, regarding the legislature’s 
intentions when creating the public nuisance offence. Mr Welford remarked that 
public order laws were directed towards promoting ‘peace and security for 
 
 43 Ibid 24. 
 44 Ibid 32. 
 45 Ibid 99. 
 46 Ibid 73, 76–7.  
 47 Ibid 73. 
 48 Ibid 75, 76–9.  
 49 Ibid 53–4.  
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people using public space’,50 and that their real purpose was ‘only to protect 
people whose security is threatened.’51 
C  The Scope of the Offence 
The judges in Coleman also differed in their views on the scope of offences 
akin to s 7. 
McHugh, Callinan and Heydon JJ favoured a wide interpretation of the s 7 
offence. Although McHugh and Callinan JJ admitted that similar offences in 
other jurisdictions had been given a narrow construction based on the text of the 
specific legislation in question,52 their Honours could see no reason for limiting 
the Queensland offence in a similar way.53 All three judges concluded that the 
words of the offence should be given their ordinary meaning and none could 
justify the implication of a ‘breach of the peace’ requirement, or a requirement 
that the words used be likely or intended to provoke violence, into the section.54  
In contrast, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ favoured a narrow interpretation of 
the offence. As noted above, in delineating the scope of the offence, their 
Honours emphasised the fact that the section created criminal offences punish-
able by imprisonment.55 Their Honours also noted that, read as a whole, the 
section was mainly aimed at regulating violent behaviour.56 Thus, their Honours 
concluded that conduct must be intended, or reasonably likely, to provoke 
unlawful physical retaliation in order to be legally unacceptable.57 
Having concluded that the ‘legitimate end’ of such legislation was the preser-
vation of public order, Gleeson CJ added that the operation of the legislation 
must be confined ‘within reasonable bounds’58 — that is, the kind of conduct 
attracting a charge must be sufficient to ‘justify the imposition of a criminal 
sanction.’59 Therefore, to fall within the section, the conduct in question must, in 
all the circumstances, breach contemporary standards of good order.60 While 
Gleeson CJ was not willing to provide an exhaustive list of such situations, his 
Honour said that it would include cases where there was an intention or likeli-
hood of provoking violence, as well as the deliberate infliction of offence or 
humiliation, or intimidation or bullying, but that the mere infliction of personal 
offence would not be enough.61 On more than one occasion, Gleeson CJ gave the 
example of a mother taking her children to a park and encountering threats or 
 
 50 See the comments of Rod Welford in Rights in Public Space Action Group, Legislated 
Intolerance? Public Order Law in Queensland (2004) 29. 
 51 Ibid (emphasis added). 
 52 Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 40 (McHugh J), 105 (Callinan J). 
 53 Ibid 40 (McHugh J), 108–9 (Callinan J). 
 54 Ibid 41 (McHugh J), 108–9 (Callinan J), 116–18 (Heydon J). 
 55 Ibid 73, 76–7 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 86–7 (Kirby J). 
 56 Ibid 73 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 86–7 (Kirby J). 
 57 Ibid 74, 77 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 87 (Kirby J). 
 58 Ibid 25.  
 59 Ibid. 
 60 Ibid 26. 
 61 Ibid. 
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abuse from a ‘group of thugs’.62 These threats or abuse would not be likely to 
provoke a breach of the peace, but should still be considered a legitimate target 
for a section of this nature.63 
Gleeson CJ’s judgment was pivotal in discerning a majority position in Cole-
man. A majority, comprised of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ, 
agreed that to come within the section, the conduct must be of an appropriate 
level of seriousness to attract the attention of the criminal law — that is, some-
thing more than mere wounding of feelings is required, but something less than 
the provocation of physical violence may suffice.64 
D  Police and Public Order Offences 
Some of the judges in Coleman also commented on whether insulting language 
directed solely at a police officer could found a criminal charge under laws in the 
nature of s 7. 
Gummow and Hayne JJ asserted that police officers are, by virtue of their 
‘training and temperament’,65 expected to ‘resist the sting of insults directed to 
them’.66 Indeed, their Honours explicitly stated that insults directed at police 
officers would not constitute an offence, unless others who might hear would be 
reasonably likely to be provoked to physical retaliation.67 
Similarly, Kirby J stated that police officers are expected to be ‘thick skinned 
and broad shouldered in the performance of their duties’,68 and thus there should 
be no prospect of police officers being provoked to act violently when insulting 
words are directed at them.69 Further, Kirby J said: 
The powers under the Act were entrusted to police officers by the Parliament of 
Queensland for the protection of the people of the State. They were not given to 
police officers to sanction, or suppress, the public expression of opinions about 
themselves or their colleagues.70 
Gleeson CJ did not go so far. His Honour remarked that police officers are not 
required to be ‘completely impervious to insult’.71 However, his Honour also 
said that in circumstances where offensive language is directed at a police 
officer, a criminal charge would probably be more difficult to justify, considering 
the absence of victimisation or a breach of the peace.72 
 
 62 See, eg, ibid 24.  
 63 Ibid 24–5. 
 64 Ibid 26 (Gleeson CJ), 77 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 87 (Kirby J). Cf a differently constituted 
majority comprised of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Callinan and Heydon JJ, which considered that 
something less than physical violence could suffice to bring behaviour within the scope of the 
offence: at 24 (Gleeson CJ), 41 (McHugh J), 108–9 (Callinan J), 116–18 (Heydon J). 
 65 Ibid 79. 
 66 Ibid. 
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Ibid 99. 
 69 Ibid. 
 70 Ibid. 
 71 Ibid 27. 
 72 Ibid 26. 
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Thus, a majority in Coleman comprised of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and 
Kirby JJ, agreed that insulting words directed at police officers would most 
likely not, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, attract a criminal charge 
under provisions akin to s 7. 
Coleman thus provides police officers, prosecutors, magistrates and legal or 
other representatives of defendants with guidance on the kinds of conduct that 
should be considered to be legally unacceptable. The key question, however, is 
whether the decision is being followed at the ‘ground level’ of policing, defend-
ing and sentencing defendants charged with such offences. 
I I I   EMPIRICAL STUDY 
A  Rationale, Methodology and Hypotheses 
In July 2004, two months before Coleman was handed down, the author under-
took a study on the public nuisance offence in Queensland.73 At that time, the 
public nuisance offence was relatively new, having come into effect in April 
2004.74  
The results of the July 2004 study suggested that the public nuisance offence 
was being overused by police, as well as being selectively enforced against 
certain marginalised groups. People were being charged with the public nuisance 
offence for engaging in trivial behaviour that included having a verbal argument 
in public (generally with a neighbour or family member), drinking alcohol in 
public and even vomiting in public.75 Many others were charged for urinating in 
public, even in circumstances where this had been the result of necessity and an 
attempt had been made to do so discretely.76 Further, a disproportionate number 
of defendants were young, indigenous, mentally or cognitively impaired, 
homeless or of low income.77  
At that time, the vast majority of public nuisance cases failed to accord with 
the standard of ‘offensiveness’ proscribed in Coleman — most did not amount to 
a serious disruption of the public order, and in only a small proportion of cases 
was the public’s safety or security threatened. However, it seemed likely that 
post-Coleman, the policing, defence and sentencing of public nuisance defen-
dants would have changed. 
To test this, the court observation project undertaken by the author in the July 
2004 study was repeated in the July 2005 study, 10 months after Coleman was 
handed down. Law students attended the Brisbane and Townsville Magistrates 
 
 73 Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance’, above n 5. See also 
Walsh, ‘Won’t Pay or Can’t Pay?’, above n 5, which includes the results of an earlier study 
examining offensive language and offensive behaviour cases that came before the Brisbane 
Magistrates Court in February 2004, prior to the introduction of the public nuisance offence. 
 74 Despite the newness of the offence, only one case observed within the 2004 study period was 
brought under the old Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) s 7, and this charge 
was excluded from the study. The lack of other charges under s 7 was largely because the Magis-
trates Court system in Queensland works swiftly — in general, court appearances take place 
only days or weeks at most after a charge is laid. 
 75 See Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance’, above n 5, 136. 
 76 Ibid 135. 
 77 Ibid 128–9. 
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Courts every day of sitting during the month of July and recorded detailed 
information regarding each public nuisance case that came before the courts. 
Information was collected on: the facts of the case; whether the defendant was 
represented by legal counsel; the penalty imposed; and the defendant’s age,78 
sex, indigenous status, socioeconomic status,79 and any signs of impaired 
capacity.80 
The two studies were conducted in the month of July in 2004 and 2005, in an 
attempt to standardise the research design. Accordingly, the results in both 
studies could reasonably be compared, considering that extrinsic factors such as 
climate and holiday periods had been taken into account for both periods.81 
There were three hypotheses for the July 2005 study. First, it was expected that 
the policing of public nuisance would have changed — that post-Coleman: 
1 fewer people would be charged with committing a public nuisance (because 
fewer cases would be capable of coming within the narrow test for offensive-
ness outlined by the majority in Coleman); 
2 the behaviour on which public nuisance charges were based would be less 
trivial (again, due to the narrow test in Coleman); and 
3 fewer public nuisance cases would be founded merely on insulting words 
being directed at police officers (because of the comments of Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ regarding offensive conduct directed at police 
officers).82 
Second, it was expected that the defence of public nuisance cases would have 
changed — specifically, that the number of defendants entering a plea of not 
guilty to public nuisance charges would increase. This is because Coleman 
provided a greater level of certainty regarding the scope of the offence, and 
defendants whose conduct was not sufficiently serious to constitute an offence, 
consistent with the majority’s construction of s 7, would more confidently be 
able to contest their charge.  
Third, it was expected that the sentencing of public nuisance defendants would 
have changed. Even if police were still charging people with the public nuisance 
offence in a manner inconsistent with the majority’s approach in Coleman, it was 
hypothesised that magistrates would dismiss a greater number of charges, or at 
least sentence defendants more leniently, in accordance with Coleman.  
 
 78 When not explicitly mentioned in court, age was estimated to be within an approximate range. 
 79 That is, whether the defendant was stated in court to be homeless or in receipt of social security 
benefits as their sole source of income. 
 80 That is, whether it was stated in court that the defendant suffered from psychological, emotional 
or cognitive impairment.  
 81 No other extrinsic factors or unique events took place around the time of either study period to 
explain any variance in the results. 
 82 See Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 26–7 (Gleeson CJ), 79 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 99 (Kirby J).  
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B  Findings regarding the Policing of Public Nuisance 
1 The Number of Public Nuisance Charges 
Contrary to the first hypothesis, more people were brought before the court for 
public nuisance charges in July 2005 than in July 2004.83 In July 2005, 111 
people came before the Brisbane Magistrates Court charged with creating a 
public nuisance, compared with 77 in July 2004. Similarly, 58 people came 
before the Townsville Magistrates Court charged with public nuisance in July 
2005, compared with 42 in 2004. This represents a 44 per cent and a 38 per cent 
increase in public nuisance cases in Brisbane and Townsville respectively as 
compared to the July 2004 study.84 The first hypothesis was therefore found to 
be incorrect: more rather than less people were appearing in court for public 
nuisance charges in Queensland post-Coleman. 
Notably, selective enforcement against vulnerable groups was still observed in 
July 2005.85 Of most concern is the fact that the number of indigenous public 
nuisance defendants soared in both Brisbane and Townsville when the two 
studies were compared. In July 2004, 10 per cent of public nuisance defendants 
in Brisbane and 35 per cent of public nuisance defendants in Townsville were 
indigenous. By July 2005, this had risen to 27 per cent and 68 per cent respec-
tively. Of further concern was the consistently high number of public nuisance 
defendants who suffered from a mental impairment. Around 15 per cent of public 
nuisance defendants observed during the 2004 and 2005 study periods were 
identified as suffering from mental impairment.86  
Thus, not only were more people charged with creating a public nuisance in 
July 2005 than in July 2004, a greater percentage of the defendants were from 
marginalised groups. 
 
 83 For the July 2004 statistics see Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public 
Nuisance’, above n 5, 128. 
 84 The change in Brisbane was statistically significant, however the change in Townsville was not. 
Consequently, it is likely that the change in Brisbane can be attributable directly to the decision 
in Coleman. 
 85 See below Table 1. 
 86 In actual fact, the rate of mental impairment amongst such defendants is likely to have been 
higher since, in lower court settings, the presence of mental impairment generally fails to be 
detected: see Walsh, ‘Offensive Language, Offensive Behaviour and Public Nuisance’, 
above n 5, 128–9. 
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Table 1: Public Nuisance Defendant Characteristics in Brisbane and 
Townsville — July 2004 and July 2005 Compared 







Characteristic     
Homeless 5 6 24 21 
Homeless or low 
income 31 29 54 41 
Indigenous 10 27 35 68 
Male 91 84 75 86 
Mental impairment 16 14 16 15 
Age     
17–25 65 61 52 30 
26–35 29 23 32 33 
36–49 4 12 8 30 
50+ 1 3 8 7 
2 The Basis for Public Nuisance Charges  
There were some differences between the facts of public nuisance cases in the 
July 2005 study compared with those in the July 2004 study: some of these 
reflect, and may be explained by, the decision in Coleman.87 For example, 
between the two studies, there was an increase in the proportion of public 
nuisance cases arising from situations where violence had occurred, or was at 
risk of occurring. In July 2004, only nine per cent of public nuisance cases in 
Brisbane arose out of a fight in a public place. In July 2005, this had risen to 27 
per cent of cases. Further, in July 2004, 16 per cent of public nuisance defen-
dants in Brisbane had been engaging in aggressive conduct in or around licensed 
premises. In July 2005, this had risen to 24 per cent of cases. There was also an 
increase in the proportion of public nuisance cases arising from instances of 
threatening conduct: such cases rose from three per cent to five per cent of all 
public nuisance cases in Brisbane, and from zero per cent to eight per cent of all 
public nuisance cases in Townsville.88  
 
 
 87 See below Table 2. 
 88 This finding lends some credence to the Queensland Government’s public statements regarding 
the importance of central business district nightclub and hotel safety considerations to the ‘re-
forms’ of public order law over the 2004–05 period: see Judy Spence, ‘Tough New Public Safety 
Laws Passed in Queensland Parliament’ (Press Release, 28 February 2005). 
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Table 2: Percentage of Cases in which Certain Facts Contributed to a 










Violence or threat of 
violence     
Assault  10 3 4 0 
Fight  9 27 15 5 
Nightclub related 
incident 16 24 11 8 
Threatening 
behaviour 3 5 0 8 
Creating a 
disturbance     
At a place of business 
or government agency 26 9 19 23 
In the vicinity of 
public property 1 6 4 10 
On a road 4 6 0 5 
Offensive behaviour 
or language     
Offensive language 
(not at police) 4 35 26 45 
Offensive language 
(directed at police) 23 22 30 20 
Verbal argument (no 
threats; no risk of 
violence) 
7 5 22 13 
Waving arms around 0 3 0 3 
 
 89 Note that the columns do not add up to 100 per cent because there is significant overlap in fact 
scenarios giving rise to public nuisance charges. For example, a person might be charged for 
committing a public nuisance in circumstances where he or she had both engaged in a fight and 
used offensive language. 
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amounts to a 
separate offence 
    
Begging  0 3 0 5 
Wilful exposure  3 0 0 8 
Urinating in public 22 15 4 26 
Behaviour associated 
with drug or alcohol 
use 
    
Behaviour associated 
with drug or alcohol 
use 
34 61 38 40 
Chroming90 0 3 0 0 
 
Notwithstanding these differences, there were many public nuisance cases that 
came before the Brisbane and Townsville Magistrates Courts in July 2005 in 
which the Coleman standard was clearly not met. 
For example, in the July 2005 study, the majority of public nuisance charges 
were brought, at least in part, for offensive language. The use of offensive 
language contributed to the charge in 56 per cent of public nuisance cases in 
Brisbane and 58 per cent of public nuisance cases in Townsville. This represents 
an increase of 24 per cent and six per cent in Brisbane and Townsville cases 
respectively as compared with the July 2004 study.91 While the reasons for this 
increase are not readily apparent, it clearly suggests that Coleman has not 
influenced police practices. 
When the precise circumstances of these cases are examined,92 it can be seen 
that the standard of seriousness established in Coleman was not being applied in 
the policing of offensive language in July 2005. In 64 per cent of the cases in 
which offensive language contributed to the charge, no other kind of ‘nuisance’ 
behaviour was observed: that is, the charge was based on the use of offensive 
language alone. There was no accompanying threat nor any apparent risk of 
physical violence. Considering the narrow circumstances in which Coleman 
sanctions an arrest on the basis of words alone,93 it would seem that Coleman is 
not being followed in practice.  
 
 90 That is, sniffing paint or another solvent. 
 91 Note that these figures do not exactly match those in above Table 2 due to the possibility of 
overlap. Table 2 shows the percentage of cases in which those fact scenarios were present. How-
ever, in some cases, there was offensive language directed at both a police officer and another 
person in the same case. As such, discrepancies exist between the figures reported here and those 
in Table 2. 
 92 See below Table 3.  
 93 See Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 26–7 (Gleeson CJ), 79 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 99 (Kirby J). 
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Further, in the July 2005 study, many people were continuing to be charged 
with creating a public nuisance for engaging in trivial behaviour which could not 
reasonably be considered offensive to the requisite degree. For example, in July 
2005, three per cent of public nuisance cases in both Brisbane and Townsville 
were based on the fact that the defendants had waved their arms around in 
public. Four people were charged with the public nuisance offence for kicking a 
street sign and three people were charged for knocking over a bin. 
Engaging in a verbal argument, where there was no threatening conduct and no 
perceived risk of violence, was also a common factual scenario leading to a 
public nuisance charge. Indeed, in Townsville in July 2005, 22 per cent of all 
public nuisance cases arose out of a nonviolent, non-threatening verbal argu-
ment. In the majority of these cases, defendants were arguing with their spouse, 
neighbour or friend, either at home, in the street or in a mall.  
Of additional relevance is the fact that during July 2005, many defendants 
were charged with creating a public nuisance, even though their behaviour would 
have been more appropriately dealt with under another section of the Summary 
Offences Act 2005 (Qld). For example, 26 per cent of public nuisance cases in 
Townsville and 15 per cent of public nuisance cases in Brisbane were for public 
urination (a 22 per cent increase in Townsville as compared with the July 2004 
study). This is despite the fact that a separate offence exists in the Summary 
Offences Act 2005 (Qld) to deal specifically with behaviour of this nature. 
Section 9 of the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) creates the offence of wilful 
exposure, and states that where a person exposes their genitals without reason-
able excuse, they commit an offence punishable by a maximum fine of $150, or 
$3000 or one year’s imprisonment in circumstances of aggravation (for example, 
where there is an intention to cause offence). The Explanatory Memorandum 
states that the section aims to make a distinction between  
situations where a person wilfully exposes himself or herself for the purpose of 
urination and attempts to find a place out of public view for that purpose, as 
opposed to those persons who expose themselves for shock value or for sexual 
gratification.94 
Despite this stated intention of the legislature and the comments of the High 
Court in Coleman, in July 2005 many people were still being charged with the 
public nuisance offence for urinating in public even where an attempt was made 
by them to do so discretely. 
Additionally, in July 2005, five per cent of public nuisance defendants in 
Townsville and three per cent of public nuisance defendants in Brisbane were 
charged with committing a public nuisance for begging in public, despite the fact 
that a separate prohibition on begging exists under Summary Offences Act 2005 
(Qld) s 8.95  
Further, in four per cent of public nuisance cases brought before the Brisbane 
Magistrates Court in July 2005, the defendants had been found chroming at the 
time of the offence, and this was stated in court to have contributed to the police 
 
 94 Explanatory Memorandum, Summary Offences Bill 2004 (Qld) 5. 
 95 See above Table 2. 
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officer’s decision to charge them. This is despite the fact that in Nel-
son v Mathieson, it was held that chroming should not be considered to be 
‘offensive’ within the meaning of public nuisance provisions.96 
3 Offensive Conduct Directed at Police Officers 
In July 2005, many people were still being charged with the public nuisance 
offence for acting ‘offensively’ towards a police officer. In 22 per cent of public 
nuisance cases in Brisbane and 25 per cent of public nuisance cases in Towns-
ville, directing offensive language or offensive behaviour towards a police 
officer contributed to the charge.97  
As can be seen in Table 3, in 45 per cent of those public nuisance cases where 
offensive language was present, a police officer was either one of the persons or 
the only person to whom the language was directed. Indeed, in 29 per cent of 
public nuisance cases in which offensive language was present, the language was 
directed solely at a police officer. Most commonly, police officers were called 
‘racist’ or ‘wankers’, or were sworn at (one defendant said ‘I don’t give a fuck’ 
when police threatened to arrest him). Another defendant called a police officer a 
‘tough bitch’. 
Thus, it seems that many cases are still being founded only on insulting lan-
guage being directed at a police officer, despite the precedent set by Coleman. 
Table 3: Target of Offensive Language in Public Nuisance Cases where 
Offensive Language was Present — July 2005, Brisbane and Townsville 
Combined 
Target of the offensive language Percentage of 
cases 
No specific target 19 
Someone previously unknown to defendant 13 
Someone known to defendant 23 
Police only 29 
Police and another 16 
C  Findings regarding the Defence of Public Nuisance Charges 
Consistent with the second hypothesis, defendants charged with creating a 
public nuisance in July 2005 were significantly more likely to contest their 
charge than those charged in July 2004. In the July 2004 study, only four per cent 
of Brisbane defendants and eight per cent of Townsville defendants contested 
their public nuisance charge, compared with 18 per cent and 19 per cent respec-
tively in July 2005. While the basis for these not guilty pleas cannot be ascer-
 
 96 (2003) 143 A Crim R 148 (Victorian Supreme Court). 
 97 Again, these figures do not exactly equate with those in above Table 2 because in some cases, 
both offensive language and offensive behaviour were directed at a police officer. 
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tained without a detailed analysis of the legal arguments,98 anecdotal evidence 
suggests that these contested charges are often based on an application of the 
narrow test of offensiveness established in Coleman.99  
While no significant differences were observed between the two studies with 
regard to the level of legal representation of defendants, the growing trend in 
Townsville of hearing public nuisance cases ex parte is concerning. As illustrated 
in Table 4, there was a significant increase in the number of such cases in 
Townsville between the two studies: from 25 per cent to 43 per cent. Hearing 
such cases ex parte denies defendants the opportunity to raise arguments in their 
defence and thus, they are unable to make use of precedents such as Coleman. 
Table 4: Representation of Public Nuisance Defendants in Brisbane and 
Townsville — July 2004 and July 2005 Compared 







Duty lawyer or legal 
aid 35 38 33 17 
Aboriginal Legal 
Service 5 7 31 33 
Self-represented 39 36 0 4 
Private lawyer 10 6 8 4 
Other (for example, 
a friend, service 
provider, public 
trustee) 
0 2 3 0 
Ex parte 10 11 25 43 
 
 98 This level of analysis was outside the scope of this project: cost prohibited the author from 
obtaining the transcripts of all public nuisance cases and it was not possible for research assis-
tants to record so much detail for each case. 
 99 Based on interviews with various Aboriginal Legal Service staff in both Brisbane and Towns-
ville. 
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D  Findings Related to the Outcomes of Public Nuisance Prosecutions 
It has been demonstrated that in July 2005 police officers did not restrict their 
public nuisance charges to situations where the Coleman standard of ‘offensive-
ness’ had been met. Yet despite this, magistrates were more likely to convict 
those charged with the public nuisance offence in July 2005 than in July 2004. In 
2005, 43 per cent of public nuisance defendants in Brisbane and 42 per cent of 
public nuisance defendants in Townsville were convicted, compared with 34 per 
cent and 30 per cent respectively in 2004. 
Further, no significant differences were observed between the penalties im-
posed for public nuisance in July 2004 and July 2005.100 Although magistrates 
were slightly more likely to discharge public nuisance defendants in July 2005 
than in July 2004, they also imposed more fines and fewer bonds. Indeed, in 
Townsville in July 2005, two public nuisance defendants were sentenced to 
imprisonment for public nuisance, one for seven days and the other for eight 
days. No one in either Brisbane or Townsville was sentenced to prison for public 
nuisance in July 2004. 
Table 5: Penalties Imposed for Public Nuisance in Brisbane and 
Townsville — July 2004 and July 2005 Compared 







Fine 74 77 72 85 
Bond recognisance 
or probation 14 3 6 0 
Discharge 3 8 0 3 
Suspended sentence 1 0 6 0 
Prison 0 0 0 6 
Community service 
order 0 2 3 0 
Arrest warrant 
issued 0 0 6 0 
Adjourned 6 11 11 9 
 
Furthermore, no significant differences were observed in fine amounts, the 
time provided to pay the fine, or the default number of days of imprisonment 
between the two studies.101 Average fines for the public nuisance offence 
generally remained at just over $200 in both Brisbane and Townsville; around 
 
100 See below Table 5. 
101 See below Table 6. 
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two months was still provided in which to pay; and a default period of around 
four days imprisonment was generally set. 
Table 6: Average Fine Amounts, Time to Pay, Payment per Month and 
Default Periods Set in Brisbane and Townsville for Public Nuisance — July 









Average fine ($) 202 212 208 223 
Average time to 
pay (months) 1.8  2.0  2.3  2.4  
Average payment 
per month ($) 112 104 90 93 
Average default 
time in custody 
(days) 
5  4  6  4  
 
Thus, contrary to the third hypothesis, few differences in the sentencing of 
public nuisance defendants were observed between July 2004 and July 2005. 
IV  CONCLUSION 
When the Coleman decision was handed down in September 2004, it seemed 
that Queensland’s new public nuisance offence was constitutionally valid, and in 
all other respects lawful. Yet, the July 2005 study demonstrates that the offence 
of public nuisance is being unlawfully applied in practice. Further research will 
be required to determine why Coleman has not effected a change in the policing 
of the public nuisance offence, or the sentencing of public nuisance defendants. 
However some suggestions may be proffered as to how the situation might be 
rectified. 
First, the wording of Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6 could be changed 
to explicitly reflect the findings of the majority in Coleman. A provision framed 
as broadly as this one provides too much discretion, and encourages selective 
and inconsistent enforcement. One option would be to insert a sub-section 
limiting the scope of ‘nuisance’ to those cases serious enough to attract the 
attention of the criminal law — that is, where the safety or security of a member 
of the public is threatened. Another would be to create a statutory defence of 
reasonable excuse, following the New South Wales model,102 so that offences 
associated with status103 and/or necessity could be successfully defended.104  
 
102 See Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) ss 4, 4A. 
103 See, eg, a public urination case involving a homeless person with no access to amenities: Walsh, 
‘Won’t Pay or Can’t Pay?’, above n 5, 220. 
104 See, eg, Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 41–2, where McHugh J raised the lack of available 
defences to Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld) s 7 as a reason in support of 
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Second, the Queensland Police Service’s Operational Procedures Manual105 
may need to be amended to incorporate the result in Coleman, and the continuing 
education of magistrates might also be required. 
Either way, the current stance of the Queensland Government that the offence 
should remain intact but ‘unenforced’ in certain circumstances will not remedy 
the injustices being perpetrated. As Willis J said in Stiles v Galinski: 
I dislike extremely legislation which is felt to be so unfair if universally applied 
that it can only be justified by saying that in particular cases it will not be en-




his Honour’s conclusion that the section was not ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ to the 
achievement of public order. 
105 Queensland Police Service, Operational Procedures Manual (28th ed, 2006). 
106 [1904] 1 KB 615, 625, as cited in Power v Coleman [2002] 2 Qd R 620, 639 (Thomas JA). 
